RESEARCH REPORTS

Theses Completed


Theses Commenced (2007)

Lachlan Clohesy, Australian Cold Warrior: A Political Biography of W.C. Wentworth, (PhD), VU.

Doris LeRoy, Religion in Cold War Australia, (MA), VU.

While in Washington, he attended the CWIHP, under Dr Christian Ostermann, located in the Woodrow Wilson International Center, where he presented a seminar on his recently released book, *Economic Statecraft during the Cold War: European Responses to the US Trade Embargo*. Frank also researched at the National Archives, London, on Cold War issues, and presented a paper at the Menzies Centre for Australian Studies in Kings College at the University of London.

Frank Bongiorno has been working on South Australian Fabianism in the 1940s and 1950s (including an interview with Clyde Cameron). He has arranged for the opening of many ASIO files that relate to active Fabians for the 1950s and 1960s. He reports that four massive ASIO files covering the 1960s and early 1970s on Frank Knopfelmacher are now open in the National Archives.

PhD Thesis Brief


The principal contention of this thesis is that the postwar Menzies government perceived as one of its most important tasks the urgent ‘revival’ of ‘liberal values’ within the Australian polity. Its elevation to power in 1949 was received by the Liberal Party and other conservative interests as a chance to prove the legitimacy of the ‘liberal’ values held to have been largely discredited by the depression and...
deposed by the Second World War’s revelation of the planned economy and the interventionist state. The main focus of this thesis is the political language and speech of a government that was explicitly seeking to change the postwar values of Australians even as it committed itself to the continuation of the postwar order.

Rather than dismantle the new order, it is argued that the Menzies government consciously set out to appropriate and redefine its key concepts and ‘best words’ – to ‘steal the dictionary’ of the new postwar order. The survival of ‘liberalism’ depended on the government’s capacity to change the way in which the principal concepts of the postwar world were defined and understood, and in this task the government’s principal tools were language and speech. It is further argued that the outbreak of the Korean War in the first months of the Menzies government’s first postwar term presented to the young government an important set of rhetorical resources for use in its efforts to redefine some of the most important terms of the postwar discourse and in its efforts to recast some of the most powerful concepts of the postwar order within a ‘liberal’ framework.

This thesis then, will examine conservative political discourse through the prism of a selection of debates, with a view to tracing the way in which the rich rhetorical resources of war were utilised in the Menzies government’s efforts to appropriate the key terms of postwar legitimacy. To this end, the chapters that follow will focus on the nature of the debate on the planned state, the social service state, full employment, prosperity, the United Nations and, more pervasively, the concepts of freedom and democracy. These concepts had become the watchwords of postwar legitimacy and represented the principal foundations of the promised new world order. This thesis follows the Menzies government’s explicit effort to capture these terms from the ‘socialism’ that was largely identified with them, and their attempts to re-inscribe them and the new post war order within a ‘liberal’ framework.

**PUBLICATIONS**


Rowan Cahill has recently had an extract from his Cold War memoir, *Cold War Kid*, a work in progress, published as, "Sunshine and Shadows", in Michael Wilding and David Myers, editors, *Confessions & Memoirs*, Central Queensland University Press, 2006.

**Book Review**

**Tom Sheridan**, *Australia’s Own Cold War: The Waterfront Under Menzies*, MUP, RRP $49.95 (print-on-demand), $39.95 (e-book).

Long, eager anticipation of a sequel to Tom Sheridan’s ground-breaking *Division of Labour: Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years 1945-1949* (OUP, 1989), has been rewarded with *Australia’s Own Cold War: The Waterfront Under Menzies*. Again, we have meticulous scholarship and informed analysis which cuts through the distortions of propaganda to reveal the substance of industrial relations in the years 1950-1967. Unlike the wide-ranging *Division of Labour*, however, Sheridan now places the stevedoring industry under the microscope. After an analysis of the parties involved in the industry, he provides a narrative of events in daunting detail. Free of jargon and abstract theorising, this is a coherent account that skillfully negotiates a myriad of complicated conflicts.

Such was the turmoil on the waterfront, that significant events occurred almost on a daily basis. An examination of the ingredients of the waterfront shows them to be “a recipe for disaster”. And “in the 1950s the waterfront [became] in Australian public consciousness...the crisis area of industrial relations”. “The rhetoric of industrial conflict and the class war seemed loudest on the wharves, aiding each of several parties to nurture fondly their respective myths about the ‘real’ causes of the conflict”. In his search for the “real” causes, Sheridan has available the myth-shattering evidence provided by the Stevedoring Industry Board and two thorough official inquiries that produced reports not intended by employers or the government.

Underpinned by such hard evidence, Sheridan is able to re-write the history of the industry and conclude, “Objective analysis reveals that waterfront problems were an amalgam of poor organisation, backward methods and archaic equipment overlaid on shipping bottlenecks and industrial relationships bedevilled on all sides with enmity and suspicion fed by memories and misunderstandings of the recent, bitter past”. The principal cause of waterfront disputes was not - as the relentless propaganda barrage asserted - a Cold War conspiracy organised in Moscow and imposed on wharfies by communist union bosses. Here, by the way, Sheridan is hinting at parallel worlds that gave a surreal dimension to the Cold War.

Sheridan correctly identifies the key to understanding this complex history of industrial relations as the unique bargaining power of labour in a period of full employment and rapid economic development. In any direct contest with employers, the WWF would extract major concessions. The State feared this would have dire consequences, and its determination to prevent such an outcome explains its extreme interventionist role. Leading from the front foot, the extraordinary HA Bland (Sec. of Dept of Labour and National Service) conspired and planned assiduously to defeat the wharfies’ claims against employers whom he regarded as hopelessly weak. Thus the government was to employ coercion,
imposing severe penalties and deploying troops on the waterfront.

Right from the outset, the Menzies Government applied coercion. In March 1950, wharfies had to retreat from a local Brisbane dispute when bludgeoned by the Crimes Act. And the justification that was to become a dominant feature of the period was voiced by the minister (Holt) as the need “to stamp out the menace of communism” which was “a treacherous, sinister, subversive conspiracy”. Menzies in a national broadcast on the dispute showed how he excelled at kicking the communist can by elaborating on how “the communists are our enemies because they are against all the things that we stand for”.

It is a remarkable achievement that Tom Sheridan has been able to peel away such heavy overlays of Cold War ideology and construct a history of industrial relations that focuses on labour relations, yet takes political factors fully into account.

It seems almost churlish to offer critical comments, and a reviewer with specialist interests of his own is prone to make unfair judgements in terms of a book he thought should have been written. But some legitimate points can be made. However successfully executed, the perspective of industrial relations history ‘written from above’ imposes limitations. While Sheridan will no doubt protest that he had to cut his material severely, I would suggest that some further detail could be sacrificed in order to enrich the perspective.

While he provides adequate summaries of wharfies’ attitudes, and effectively demolishes hostile stereotypes, there are not the insights of ‘history from below’ and there is no enlivening context of working class culture. Serious, too, is the inadequacy of the few passing references to the role of women (pp 68, 184, 240). Sheridan’s sympathies are evident throughout what might otherwise have been a sterile study in industrial relations. One personal opinion that shapes the account is that, “In studying Australian industrial history for 40 years I have come across no more capable and attractive figure than Healy [Gen. Sec. of WWF]”. My quibble is that Ted Roach (Asst. Gen. Sec. WWF) suffers by comparison. In dismissing Roach, Sheridan closes off the opportunity to discuss a vitally important strand in WWF and labour history: that is, syndicalism, with its emphasis on the rank and file, and direct action on the job. While the book demonstrates that the waterfront turmoil was not the result of a red plot, it does not follow that communists exerted no influence - however difficult that might be to measure. They were a very active force on the waterfront, and some discussion of their policies and organisation, apart from the faction fighting, would have been in order.

The title *Australia’s Own Cold War* may raise expectations by Cold War historians that are not fulfilled. Manifested as the all pervasive anti-communism, the Cold War is the persistent context of the book. But from the wider perspective of political economy, the reconstruction of the economy was a dimension of the Cold War that ushered in the Golden Years of the Menzies Era. As the stevedoring industry was one of the strategic “bottleneck” industries covered by a vanguard communist-led union, its reconstruction was a top priority for state intervention. Sheridan is fully aware of the significance of technological change and the imperative of reconstruction (e.g. decasualisation), but they tend to be treated episodically, rather than as shaping themes. Rather disconcertingly, there is a summary
wrapping-up of the big issues in the final pages. Such an account necessarily has a terminating date with no closure of the issues which continue to be fought over. Though not specifically identified as such by Sheridan, the fundamental issue was - and, indeed, remains - the control of labour time, as was dramatically illustrated in the 1998 dispute.

Melbourne University Press is to be congratulated on its decision to publish this monograph and on its quality. And I noticed very few blemishes (p.67, sugar bags weighed 180lbs not 250). Finally, this study will well become highly valued for other reasons. Mandarins such as Bland, are unlikely in the future, nor will historians have available such rich archival evidence for more recent years.

(LJ Louis)

FOR THE LIBRARY


This study explores the implications of the transition from Roosevelt to Truman in 1945, and in the process casts light on the outbreak of the Cold War. It argues that the real departure in American policy came only after the Truman administration had exhausted the legitimate possibilities of the Rooseveltian approach of collaboration with the Soviet Union.


Spalding claims Truman “conceived, enunciated, and directed the strategy of containment”. Truman inaugurated two major initiatives to stem what he saw as the march of communism across Europe: the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. Spalding argues that it was presidential advisor Clark Clifford, in a memo that integrated Truman’s words and actions with administration policies from 1947 to 1949, that formed the basis of containment, and not George Kennan.


How the Korean War changed American history.


Argues that responses to the Cold War greatly advanced "anti-statism" in the United States during the Truman years, thereby reorienting and damaging the goals of American liberalism.

Using newly declassified intelligence files, memoirs of eye-witnesses, and interviews with key players, Amy Knight explains how this historic defection propelled Western governments into feverish, politically-motivated hunts for Soviet spies and a breakdown in relations with the Soviet Union. She exposes myths about the Affair, and challenges the evidence that Hiss was a spy. [Knight was a participant in the Hiss Conference reported below.]


This book profiles each DCI and explains how they performed their roles of enhancing cooperation among the many parts of the nation's intelligence community and of reporting foreign intelligence to the president. It also discusses the evolving expectations that U.S. presidents placed on their foreign intelligence chiefs.


Craig painstakingly gathered all known documents on the White case and argues that White was simultaneously "one of the most notorious spies in American history" and yet, by White's own lights, an idealist, whose covert activities were in the best interests of the United States by fostering a partnership for peace with the Soviet Union.


An heretical, dovish discourse. Integrating fifteen years of field research at weapons laboratories across the United States with discussion of popular movies, political speeches, media coverage of war, and the arcane literature of defence intellectuals, Gusterson shows how the military-industrial complex has built consent for its programs and, in the process, taken the public "nuclear".


Examines five initiatives designed to prevent or restrain the nuclear arms race: the international option, the commercial option, the moral option, the multilateral option, and the legal option. Their conclusions show the extent to which non-proliferation policy dominated European politics and the transatlantic relationship.


Also published as Special Issue of Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 18 No. 2, 2003.


Osgood chronicles the secret psychological warfare programs America developed at the height of the Cold War. These programs - which were often indistinguishable from CIA
covert operations - went well beyond campaigns to foment unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The effort was global: U.S. propaganda campaigns targeted virtually every country in the free world. And at home, U.S. psychological warfare programs blurred the lines between foreign and domestic propaganda.


Themes and arguments contained in the book include: the centrality of the German and Japanese threats to Stalin's thinking about the post-war world; the role of Soviet perceptions of growing Western anti-communism in Stalin's abandonment of the Grand Alliance and embrace of the Cold War; the role of the "patriotic" factor in Stalin's post-war policy and relations with the West; the interaction of Soviet domestic and foreign policies in the formation of Stalin's Cold War policy; Stalin's return to a pro-détente policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Roberts argues that his research vindicates much of the revisionist side of the debate, but that he sees the book as a piece of post-revisionism because of its stress on the role in Soviet policy of Stalin's ideological aspirations and ambitions, and that therefore there is a convergence between his work and the writings of post-traditionalist historians who have worked in Soviet archives for the early post-war period

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**Another Movie Script**


A former CIA chief of Soviet bloc counter-intelligence reopens the mysterious case of KGB officer Yuri Nosenko’s 1964 defection. Conspiracy theorists have long been obsessed with Nosenko's supposed role as the KGB officer who handled the Moscow file of Lee Harvey Oswald, JFK's assassin. Was Nosenko a bona fide defector with the real information about Lee Harvey Oswald’s stay in Soviet Russia, or was he a KGB loyalist, engaged in a complex game of deception?

For over four years Nosenko was a prisoner of the CIA, living in extremely harsh conditions, as they sought to have him admit that he had been lying. James Angleton, chief of the CIA's counter-intelligence unit, believed that Nosenko was a double agent whose main task was to distract the agency from a KGB mole. And Bagley now offers supporting evidence. The case has titillated novelists and screenwriters - most recently providing the background for Robert De Niro's spy film "The Good Shepherd." (Of the lurid glimpse of the Nosenko interrogation in the trailer for *The Good Shepherd*, Bagley told a reporter, “Pure horseshit.”)

Amy Knight is of the opinion Bagley “fails to make a convincing case”.

*St Petersburg Times*, 18/5/07.

**Stalin: Bad But Not Mad**


Between 1945 and 1953, while the Soviet Union confronted post war reconstruction and Cold War crises, Joseph Stalin carved out time to study scientific disputes and dictate academic solutions. He spearheaded a discussion of "scientific" Marxist-Leninist philosophy, edited reports on genetics and physiology, adjudicated
controversies about modern physics, and wrote essays on linguistics and political economy. Historians usually dismiss all this as megalomaniacal ravings. But Ethan Pollock draws on thousands of previously unexplored archival documents to reveal a practical dimension.

Focusing on six major post war debates in the Soviet scientific community, this book shows that Stalin's forays into scholarship can be understood only within the context of international tensions, institutional conflicts, and the growing uncertainty about the proper relationship between scientific knowledge and Party-dictated truths. The nature of Stalin's interventions makes clear that more was at stake than high politics: these science wars were about asserting that the Party was rational and modern, and about codifying the Soviet worldview in a battle for the hearts and minds of people around the globe during the early Cold War.

The net effect on the development of each specific discipline was different. Physics, whose role in making the atomic bomb was critical, remained almost untouched. One of the most egregious cases of ideology run amok was the "biological war" waged by pseudo-biologist Trofim Lysenko. However, Pollock argues that Stalin never bought Lysenko's arguments on the "class nature" of this science. Rather, Stalin and the Party's support for Lysenko was the outgrowth of the desperation that had set in once it was clear that collectivization had failed to transform Soviet agriculture. Stalin counted on Lysenko to provide practical, indeed miraculous, results for the food supply. This gamble, however, assured that armies of serious scientists would perish and that Soviet biology would be damaged for generations.

**Were NATO’S Secret Armies Linked to Terrorism?**


In 1990, the then Italian prime minister, Giulio Andreotti, confirmed the existence of a secret stay-behind army code-named “Gladio” within the state. This prompted research by Ganser who has revealed that stay-behind armies covered all of Western Europe, operating under different code names, such as Gladio in Italy, Absalon in Denmark, P26 in Switzerland, ROC in Norway, I&O in the Netherlands, and SDRA8 in Belgium. The Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) and the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC), linked to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), coordinated the stay-behind networks on an international level.

The secret stay-behind armies served a dual purpose during the Cold War: They were to prepare for a communist Soviet invasion and occupation of Western Europe, and – also in the absence of an invasion – for an “emergency situation.” The first purpose was clear enough, but the second is not and remains the subject of ongoing research. During the Cold War, the national military secret services in the countries of Western Europe differed greatly in what they perceived to be an emergency situation. But there was agreement between the military secret services of the United States and of Western Europe that communist parties, and to some degree also socialist parties, had a real potential to weaken NATO from within and therefore represented a threat to the alliance. The evidence now available suggests that in some countries the secret stay-behind armies linked up with...
right-wing terrorists and carried out terror attacks that were later wrongly blamed on the political left in order to discredit the communists and prevent them from assuming top executive positions.

The on-going research project into NATO’s secret armies is being undertaken by the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, headed by Ganser.

**Russian Roulette**


A revisionist account of Nikita Khrushchev’s conduct of the Cold War from 1955 until his removal in 1964.

Based upon their access to the transcripts of meetings of the Presidium, Naftali and Fursenko argue against the version that Khrushchev was surrounded by hardliners bent on confrontation. In fact, Khrushchev himself was the chief architect of Soviet foreign policy and it was he who deliberately set out to provoke a series of confrontations with the United States and its allies. According to Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev believed that if the Americans knew how far ahead they were in the strategic nuclear balance of power, they would exploit their advantage and destroy the Soviet Union; thus Soviet nuclear inferiority had to be hidden. Until it could catch up with the Americans, it would have to act as though it actually was the strategic equal of the United States. The way to do this, he told his colleagues early in 1962, as he was on the brink of taking his most dangerous nuclear gamble, was to maintain such a high level of tension in international affairs that the Americans would respect the Soviet position and make concessions which they otherwise would not.

Rejecting the dismissal of Khrushchev as a reckless buffoon, Fursenko and Naftali see logic in his erratic behaviour. They contend that the Soviet leader wanted to ease tensions and to focus on raising his country’s abysmal standard of living. “Khrushchev,” they write, “imagined a grand settlement with the United States that would demilitarize the cold war, allowing him to redirect resources to the Soviet civilian economy and restrict the East-West struggle to the ideological and economic level, where he was convinced history would ultimately prove him right.” What changed repeatedly, Fursenko and Naftali say, was Khrushchev’s strategy for attaining such a settlement. But as Fursenko and Naftali point out, any success Khrushchev may have had came at an enormous cost. His risk-taking not only put the world through hair-raising crises, but also played straight into the hands of American hawks. [Naftali was a participant at Hiss Conference reported below.]


Though neither side achieved its immediate objectives, as events unfolded, it was Nixon and Kissinger coming to Beijing in February 1972, that inaugurated, as MacMillan puts it, "the week that changed the world".

Bedtime Reading for Conservatives


“A dramatic account of how President Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher together took on the most powerful and aggressive foe that liberty has ever known -- and won.”

Journal Articles


This article examines a hitherto unexplored aspect of the Anglo-American "special relationship," the development of arrangements to coordinate U.S. and British forces in a joint nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.


This article examines the foundation and purpose of the International Information and Documentation Center or ‘Interdoc’. Founded in 1963 in The Hague, Interdoc was meant to develop a psychological response to the Soviet strategy of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Interdoc's central focus was to increase the level of understanding of communist doctrine and practice by stimulating and making available well-researched information on the policies and realities of the Soviet bloc. By the end of the 1960s Interdoc had expanded into a centre of increasing activity for research, training, conference, and publication programmes. However, at the point when plans were being made to extend its operations by making contacts with the Eastern bloc, Chancellor Brandt's pursuit of Ostpolitik caused a catastrophic withdrawal of German financial support.


Based on recently declassified documents of the NATO archives, this article examines the foundation of the NATO Information Service and of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations and offers an insight into the organization's activity in the fields of counter-propaganda and prevention of subversive activities. This article demonstrates how their intergovernmental nature allowed both agencies to act as forums for the exchange of views on anti-communist propaganda and prevention of subversive activities between the organization's members.

CWIHP PAPERS

CWIHP Working Paper No. 55, "Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal," by Guy Laron (International Relations Department at Hebrew University of Jerusalem).

The working paper and documentary appendix can be downloaded at [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/publications/WP55_Web_Final.pdf](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/publications/WP55_Web_Final.pdf) or go to [http://cwihp.org](http://cwihp.org) and click on the right-hand "publications" link.
CWIHP Working Paper No. 54,
“Evolution and Revolution: Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution”, by Péter Vámos (Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.) He argues against the claim that Chinese pressure was critical in convincing Soviet leaders to intervene militarily in Hungary. The Paper can be downloaded at the CWIHP website http://www.cwihp.org.

CWIHP Working Paper No. 51
To download the Paper, visit http://www.cwihp.org and click on the "publications" link.

DOCUMENTS

Bonanza for US Researchers
The New York Times, 21 Dec, 2006, reported that at midnight on Dec. 31, 2006, hundreds of millions of pages of secret documents were to be declassified, including many C.I.A. and F.B.I. Cold War files. After years of extensions sought by federal agencies, this means the government’s first automatic declassification of records. Secret documents 25 years old or older will lose their classified status, unless agencies have sought exemptions on the ground that the material remains secret. Every year from now on, millions of additional documents will be automatically declassified, reversing the traditional practice of releasing just what scholars request.

Many historians had expected President Bush to scrap the deadline. His administration has overseen the reclassification of many historical files and restricted access to presidential papers of past administrations, as well as contemporary records.

Practical considerations, including a growing backlog of records at the National Archives, mean that it could take months before the declassified papers are ready for researchers.

The CIA has released 30 million pages and created a database of documents, Crest, that is accessible from terminals at the National Archives. Although most of the documents are exempt, they can be requested under the Freedom of Information Act.

The FBI has rushed to review material, seeking exemption for 50 million pages on intelligence, counterintelligence and terrorism, but leaving 270 million pages to be automatically declassified now.

As Australian researchers know only too well, exemptions will remain a major hurdle.

UK National Archives: Document Releases
Alan Nunn May (KV 2/2209-2226; 2563-2564)
These 20 files (19 reconstituted and one original) record in detail the case of British atom spy Alan Nunn May, whose espionage activities for the Soviets were first drawn to the attention of the British authorities when the Russian diplomat Gouzenko identified him to the Canadian police as the Soviet agent ALEX. ALEX had been feeding information and samples to his handler.
GRANT, the Soviet military attaché Colonel Zabotin.

Dr Klaus Fuchs (1952-9)  
This file looks at issues arising during Dr Fuchs’ imprisonment, including the possibility of extraditing Fuchs to the USA once he has finished his sentence in the UK, and allegations that some of his documents were smuggled out of Pentonville prison. PREM 11/2799.

Disappearance of the Cold War spies: Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess  
This file contains correspondence relating to the potential risks posed by Maclean’s participation in the USA Atomic Energy Committee and also correspondence and reports on the career paths of both Burgess and Maclean.

PREM 11/2859, 1959, Further testing of nuclear weapons, November 1957  
This file relates to planning for a second round of tests to take place on Christmas Island. It contains correspondence to the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as internal notes relating to the tests, and the impact they may have on the discussions taking place on nuclear disarmament. The tests eventually took place in November 1957.

Communist influences in armed forces: measures taken to forewarn men in forces against attempts to seduce them from their allegiance  
This file looks at how to protect the armed forces from the influences of Communism following certain cases where Communist sympathies have affected the armed forces. 1950/1. Prem 8/1528.

The Nuclear Program Research Collection of the Natural Resources Defense Council  
The Collection is housed at the National Security Archive at the Gelman Library of George Washington University. (Refer to their Guide for Researchers at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/archive/resguide.htm).

The documents were collected by the staff of the Nuclear Program of NRDC over a period of approximately 25 years beginning in 1980. Boxes 1-4 contain basic DOD and DOE documents; Boxes 6, 8 and 9 contain dozens of official histories, many obtained through the FOIA. Boxes 10-24 contain files about military bases and installation in almost every state from Alabama to Wyoming. The emphasis is on nuclear activities as the files were used to support Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race by William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985). Boxes 25-31 contain files on the MX Missile, B52, B-1 and B-2 Bombers, SRAM, ALCM, Trident SSBNs and SLBMs, Pershing II and GLCM. Boxes 32-33 contain files on the INF Treaty and Boxes 34-37 files on the SALT II, START I and START II Treaties.

The National Security Archive has published, through Central European University Press, a collection of previously secret documentation entitled From Solidarity to Martial Law, edited by Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne, 2006. The documents from inside Solidarity, the Polish leadership, the Kremlin as well as the White House and CIA provide a new perspective on this dramatic Cold War episode.
Among many important details, the new collection shows that although a crackdown of some kind had long been feared and anticipated, it nonetheless took most observers outside of Poland, especially the United States, by surprise. U.S. officials also misread the Polish leadership, concluding earlier in 1981 that they would use martial law only as a way to "maximize deterrence" against Moscow, whereas internal Polish and Soviet records make clear that Poland’s leaders were intent on reasserting control over society, a goal they fully shared with the Kremlin.

(Follow the link below to read sample documents from the new volume: http://www.nsarchive.org)

**PINOCHET: A Declassified Documentary Obit**

In December 2006, as Chile prepared to bury General Augusto Pinochet, the National Security Archive posted a selection of declassified U.S. documents that illuminate the former dictator’s record of repression. Most of the documents are drawn from a collection of 24,000 declassified records that were released by the Clinton administration after Pinochet’s October, 1998, arrest in London. Many of them are reproduced in Kornbluh’s book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. (Pinochet died on December 10, which was International Human Rights Day.)

**Bulgaria**

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) has published the CD-ROM “Bulgaria and Middle East Conflict during the Cold War Years”. The CD contains 255 documents selected from the Bulgarian state and Communist Party archives which provide new information on the diplomatic, political, military, and security aspects of the Middle East conflict and the evolution of Bulgarian policy on the issue. For further information, see http://www.cwihp.org

**WHO TO BELIEVE?**

In 1947, an elaborate bugging system, including 14 microphones, was uncovered in the Australian Legation in Moscow. In an indignant reply to Australia’s “baseless and quarrelsome pretensions”, the Soviet Government explained that during the war partisan groups installed microphones in buildings that might be used by a German Military Command if Moscow was occupied.(Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia and the Postwar World, Documents 1947, pp.422-7).

**They Say Documents Do Not Lie**


**CONFERENCES**

**ASSLH Conference, 4-6 July, 2007, University of Melbourne**

This will include a Cold War stream with papers by: Drew Cottle and Angela Keys (Asian Airlines), Stephen Holt (Bert Cremean and Santamaria), Michael Lyons (DLP), Rowan Cahill (Rupert Lockwood), Phillip Deery (ASIO), Andrew Moore (Fitzpatrick / Browne affair), Frank Cain (Evatt and Petrov affair), Laurence Maher (Evatt and Petrov defection); and screenings of "Indonesia Calling" (Drew Cottle), and John Hughes' "Archive Project". There are also several other relevant papers.
Australian Historical Association: 2007 Regional Conference

University of New England, Armidale, 23-26 September 2007
For details: www.une.edu.au/campus/confco/aha2007/
Email: fbongior@une.edu.au or eihde2@une.edu.au
Phone: (02) 6773 2088 or (02) 6773 2176
Fax: (02) 6773 3520

GOVERNING BY LOOKING BACK: How History Matters in Society, Politics and Government

First Annual Interdisciplinary Social Sciences Conference
Hosted by the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University
Canberra, 12-14 December 2007

Topics that would interest Cold War historians include:
- Public remembrance and forgetting in Australia;
- Learning from history wars;
- Use and abuse of historical analogies in public deliberation and policy design;

Conference program correspondence to: Tim Rowse, History Program, RSSS (tim.rowse@anu.edu.au)
Paul ‘t Hart, Political Science Program, RSSS (hart@coombs.anu.edu.au).


The Polish Institute for National Remembrance (IPN) and the Institute of Political Studies are jointly organizing an international conference on the Communist movement, 1944-1956, to mark the 60th anniversary of the Cominform's establishment. The conference will be held in Szklarska Poreba, where the Cominform was probably established.

The conference program has four themes and sessions:
1. Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe in the period of power seizure from 1944 to 1948
2. Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe from 1949 to 1956
3. Communist parties in the West from 1944 to 1956
4. Internal relations in the worldwide communist movement from 1944 to 1956.

The conference will be conducted in English, German and Polish. For more information, visit http://www.ipn.gov.pl/conference2007


The conference will be hosted by the Office of the Historian in the Bureau of Public Affairs, and will feature keynote presentations on U.S.-Russian relations by Department of State principals and comments from former diplomats and senior scholars from both the United States and Russia. The Program Committee invites proposals for original papers dealing with the geopolitical and strategic implications of détente from 1969 to 1976.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/70893.htm

2007 Churchill Archives Student Conference

The Churchill Archives Centre has announced its first 'Churchill Archives Student Conference' to take place at the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge on 30
November 2007. It will focus on aspects of British foreign policy and international relations in the "Churchill Era and beyond" with the title: 'Balancing Europe, Empire and America: Was Churchill right?' The Churchill Archives Centre will not be able to fully fund the travel and accommodation expenses of all participants, but accepted applicants may apply for a partial bursary towards covering their costs.

Grants: National Archives of Australia

The National Archives is calling for applications for grants that promote advanced research and professional development using its collection.

2007 Fredrick Watson Fellowship for established scholars - $15,000
The fellowship provides a range of benefits for researchers that extend beyond financial support. Applicants should have either a postgraduate degree or a demonstrated record of published work.
Applications close on 29 June 2007.

2007 Margaret George Award for emergent historians, academics, independent researchers and journalists - $10,000. Applicants should have a clear record of achievement and the potential to excel further.
Applications close on 29 June 2007.

For further information about these awards, visit the National Archives website at www.naa.gov.au, email inquiries to grants@naa.gov.au, or ring (02) 6212 3600.

VISITING SCHOLAR WASHINGTON: CALL FOR APPLICATIONS

The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, is inviting applications from US and foreign scholars who need to be in residence in Washington, D.C. for their research and writing on topics related to Europe, Eurasia, the cold war, and/or the interconnections between history, politics and international affairs in Europe and/or Eurasia. Senior scholars, post-doctoral scholars, and students working on their dissertations in the fields of political science, history, international affairs, economics, sociology, anthropology, and language and literature are eligible to apply. Applicants should have funding from elsewhere, such as a fellowship or a university sabbatical. Scholars may be in residence at IERES for a period from one month to one year. Visiting scholars at IERES will have office space and library privileges and will be encouraged to participate in events at IERES. Interested scholars should send their CV, a 2-page description of their research project (including why a residency at IERES would be beneficial), and the proposed dates of residency.

Applications are accepted on a rolling basis throughout the year. For more information about IERES, please visit: http://www.ieres.org

THE COLD WAR RAGES ON: PART 2

(See CWD No 19 for Part 1)

Earlier this year, the new Center for the United States and the Cold War, New York University, announced that it would hold its Inaugural Conference,
“Alger Hiss and History”, on April 5, 2007. As the conveners explained: “The 1948 Alger Hiss case was a major moment in post-World War II America that reinforced Cold War ideology and accelerated America’s late-1940’s turn to the right. When Hiss, one of the nation’s more visible New Dealers, was accused of spying for the Soviet Union and convicted of perjury, his case was seen as one of the most significant trials of the 20th century, helping to discredit the New Deal, legitimise the red scare, and set the stage for the rise of Joseph McCarthy. As scholars have gained access to the archives in the former Soviet Union and more U.S. documents have been declassified, there has been renewed debate about the Hiss case itself and the larger issues of repression, civil liberties, and internal security that many believe speak to current public policy and discussions.”

The intemperate response to the announcement revealed the persistent intensity of the domestic Cold War, as old antagonists attacked the Conference in advance for challenging “the consensus”. Ronald Radosh (professor emeritus of history at CUNY, and an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute) blasted the new centre, and condemned the proposed Hiss Conference, insisting that, “Allen Weinstein ended the debate over Hiss's claim that he had not spied for the Soviets with the publication of *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case*, in 1979. More recently, Sam Tanenhaus, provided further evidence in support of Weinstein's conclusion when he issued *Whittaker Chambers*. When Weinstein and Tanenhaus turned down their invitations, why didn't the organisers try to find replacements to represent their (well-documented) views? Presently, they have only one such person--law professor Edward White of the University of Virginia...”; although, later, Radosh concedes, “To be fair to the conveners, the conference does include a few token people with either the opposite or a more nuanced point of view. These include the Pulitzer Prize-winning historian David Oshinsky, Nixon Library Director Timothy Naftali, and White... But where are scholars like Harvey Klehr or John Haynes, both of whom have written at length about Soviet espionage in Hiss’s day?”

“Clearly, what the institute desires is the resurrection of Old Left myths... Thus, rather than a conference about the meaning and impact of the Hiss case in America, it appears to be precisely a one-sided event, meant to rehabilitate Hiss's reputation, spread new myths about his innocence, and take us back to the time before Weinstein's account was written”. Finally, Radosh flourished the opinion of the editor of Harvard's *Journal of Cold War Studies* that the meeting "consists of diehard supporters of Hiss whose attempts to explain away all the new available evidence are thoroughly unconvincing." (At TNR Online, Post date: 03.12.07)

[Note: Conference conveners retorted that they had told the TNR fact-checker before this appeared, that they did invite Tanenhaus, Klehr, Weinstein who declined.]

Antagonism to the proposed conference was heightened by its denunciation in similar terms by the press. *The Sun*, New York, 23/3/07, warned, “Long after world communism and its American variant have been discredited, a strange effort to resurrect its memory and glamorize its "heroes" is taking place ...[with] a slew of programs under the auspices of a new Center for the United States and the Cold War...The Alger Hiss and History... panels are noteworthy for the absence of major writers who have painstakingly proven Hiss' guilt and activity as a Soviet spy.”
At the Conference, Kai Bird and Svetlana A. Chervonnaya presented a paper that provoked sensational press reports of the likely “posthumous vindication of Hiss”—though they were, in fact, more circumspect. Bird challenged the critical Venona evidence that identified Hiss as the spy “Ales”. Bird claimed he and co-researcher had identified nine possible suspects among U.S. State Department officials and by a process of elimination excluded eight of them, including Hiss. "It left only one man standing: Wilder Foote".

Also at the Conference, Timothy Hobson, an 80-year-old retired surgeon who was Hiss's stepson and grew up in the family home, said Whittaker Chambers had lied about his personal relationship with Hiss and had never visited the Hiss home as he claimed. "It is my conviction that he was in love with Alger Hiss, that he was rejected by Alger Hiss and he took that rejection in a vindictive way".

Among the speakers arguing that Hiss was guilty, G. Edward White said Hiss supporters use a "thread strategy," seizing on any "inconsistency" to unravel a scenario aiming to vindicate him of the spy charges. "We can't say that the absence of evidence is evidence." (For a report of the Conference, New York Times, April 6, 2007. The Bird paper is to be published in the next (Summer Issue) of The American Scholar, and the delay has inspired rumours that it is being revised. Kai Bird is co-author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning American Prometheus: the Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer.

[Note: The Bird paper was published just as this issue of the Dossier was going to press. See: http://www.theamericanscholar.org/su07/ales-birdlong.html.]


Seeking to turn the tables they declaimed, “Once upon a time, it was called McCarthyism to charge people with being Communists or spies on the basis of slim or no evidence, shaky logic, or the word of one or two informers of dubious reliability. No longer. Bird and Chervonnaya established new standards of proof, in which the absence of evidence is as good as proof. Absolving Alger Hiss of being ALES is apparently that important, even if it means recklessly slandering a long-deceased, distinguished public servant, Wilder Foote…” They are obliged, however, to concede, “To be fair to Bird… the news media blew his supposed discovery completely out of proportion, falsely claiming that if Hiss were not ALES, then Hiss was not a Soviet spy”. However, “the astonishing and grossly irresponsible charge against Wilder Foote is a perfect example of the McCarthyite techniques that Hiss’s defenders have long and hotly denounced”. Much of the Hiss controversy has centred on the Venona evidence, but Haynes and Klehr now argue, “On balance, VENONA 1822 was but a tiny codicil to an already overwhelming case”.

(John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, “The New McCarthyism”, Washington DeCoded ,11 April 2007.)

Any merit of other papers at the inaugural conference of the Centre was lost in the imbroglio, which proved
again that “this is a case that will not die”. In his key-note address, Victor Navasky (Columbia University, Publisher Emeritus, *The Nation*), in suggesting ten possible reasons, proposed that for some, the controversy was not primarily arguments about historical fact, but “a continuation of ideological politics by other means…” And he continued, “Whittaker Chambers himself may have provided the best explanation for the enduring interest in this case when …he wrote, “it epitomized a basic conflict and Alger Hiss and I were the archetypes. This is of course what gave the peculiar intensity to the struggle””. On 26 March 1984, President Reagan posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Chambers with the citation, “he became the focus of a momentous controversy in American history that symbolized our century’s epic struggle between freedom and totalitarianism…” More recently, the potency of the case was illustrated when Clinton's nominee for the CIA, Anthony Lake, had to withdraw from contention not least because he said on "Meet the Press" that he found the evidence against Alger Hiss "inconclusive." The Hiss case is not about to die.


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**A STAGNANT POOL OF ‘TALENT’**

The National Security Archive has posted some of the most important documents to come out of the Iran-Contra Affair 20 years ago (the covert arms-for-hostages deals with Iran and the secret U.S. backing for the Nicaraguan Contras.) Among the documents being posted are records that relate to the actions (or inaction) of Robert M. Gates, who has replaced Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Gates came under fire for deliberately looking the other way as the Iran and Contra programs went along. Questions about his role derailed his nomination to head the CIA in 1987, although he ultimately was named DCI four years later, in 1991, under President George H.W. Bush. The documents are available on the Archive's Web site: [http://www.nsarchive.org](http://www.nsarchive.org)

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**SURVIVAL SECRETS FOR ATOMIC ATTACKS**

In 1950, the National Security Resources Board issued Doc. 130. This was the official U.S. government booklet, “Survival under Atomic Attack”.

The 4 pages in the centre of the booklet (15-18) were designed to be removed and memorised:

**SIX SURVIVAL SECRETS FOR ATOMIC ATTACKS**

ALWAYS PUT FIRST THINGS FIRST AND NEVER loose your head and

1. TRY TO GET SHIELDED
2. DROP FLAT ON GROUND OR FLOOR
3. BURY YOUR FACE IN YOUR ARMS
4. DON'T RUSH OUTSIDE RIGHT AFTER A BOMBING
5. DON'T TAKE CHANCES WITH FOOD OR WATER IN OPEN CONTAINERS
6. DON'T START RUMORS’
Bunkers Bunkum

On July 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy went on television to explain the grave meaning and still graver consequences of the deepening crisis over Berlin. In consequence, he was calling upon Congress to appropriate $93,000,000 to provide shelter for the population against radioactive fallout. Those few ominous words triggered off what was to become a national craze and one of the most revealing moral debates in our history as “one nation under God.” The subject: building fallout shelters for oneself and one’s family in hopes of surviving attack in a thermonuclear war.

For years Americans had been told about radioactive fallout: that killing radiation could not penetrate concrete or steel or even earth or brick. There had been champions of home fallout shelters, but the results had been virtually nil. The day after his electrifying speech the President drove home the point again. He was asking Congress for $10,000,000 to build an alarm system for private homes—the National Emergency Alarm Repeater, acronymically known as NEAR. You plugged a little device into your wall socket (price five to ten dollars) and the Air Defence Command would activate it when Soviet missiles began flying.

This sent America flying at once into phase two: a frantic mass search for information, for blueprints, for precise lists of emergency supplies. Civil Defense officials distributed no fewer than 22,000,000 copies of the Eisenhower administration’s Family Fallout Shelter. And millions of Americans requested another long-neglected government pamphlet: Family Food Stockpile for Survival.

In September a rash of “survival stores” erupted around the country. There the home-shelter builder could purchase such items as: “a citizen’s instrument kit” ($20.00) which told you how much radiation your body had absorbed while you waited for the all-clear signal; the Survive-All, Incorporated, food kit ($8.95), which provided two weeks worth of rations for one; General Mills’s MPF or “multipurpose food”; Nabisco’s seven-pound tins of “survival rations,” which reportedly tasted “like animal crackers”; Mead Johnson’s Nutrament, originally developed as a quick lunch for assembly-line workers; a variety of blowers ($74.00) for forcing fresh air into your shelter; air filters ($55.00) to assure that the fresh air was not radioactive; and a profusion of “lifesaving kits” complete with “anti-radiation” pills and salves which turned out to be the lineal descendants of snake oil and the golden elixir.

Shelter advocates insisted that home shelters were cheap and easy to build. Dr. Libby stirred the hopes of millions of modest wage-earners when he announced in his syndicated series that he had built a shelter in the backyard of his Bel-Air, California, home for a mere thirty dollars. (See DIY below) Shelter manufacturers began appearing in droves. Most of them were suburban and small-town contractors prepared to make a fast dollar by installing backyard shelters. Others, more ambitious, offered completely prefabricated steel or concrete shelters priced, on the average, at around two thousand dollars.

All the elements of a mass movement seemed firmly in place. Yet, amazingly enough, in an age of mass media and
mass persuasion, the overwhelming majority of Americans could not be persuaded to do anything. According to Civil Defense officials, the popular inertia was due to a merely temporary public “confusion”. According to the Times, the inertia was due to a “fatalistic” attitude.

Doubts about the morality of home shelters had been bubbling under the surface almost from the moment the frenzy began. What stirred them initially were the widely reported remarks made by an Austin, Texas, hardware dealer when his ninety thousand-dollar home shelter was completed in early August. He had outfitted his elaborate bunker, he told local reporters, with four rifles in order to shoot any neighbours who tried to invade it when the bombs began to fall. Moreover, in case they jumped into his haven before he did, “I’ve got a .38 tear-gas gun, and if I fire six or seven tear-gas bullets into the shelter, they’ll either come out or the gas will get them.” The Texan’s views were brutally expressed but they were also undeniably logical. Civil Defense officials saw no moral difficulties in that. “There’s nothing in the Christian ethic which denies one’s right to protect oneself”.

Despite the furious spate of official propaganda, exceedingly few home shelters were ever built. The shelter craze died, not with a bang but a whimper, the whimper of shelter merchants going broke.

DIY SHELTER
Willard Libby, commissioner, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1954-59, 1960 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, opposed public funding for shelters and insisted they could be constructed cheaply. To promote his cause, Libby wrote a 15-part newspaper series titled “You Can Survive Atomic Attack,” featuring a less-than-$30 “poor man’s shelter” he had built in West Los Angeles out of railroad ties, old tires, and bags of dirt. “Libby’s argument for the viability of the poor man’s shelter was undercut somewhat when this structure was subsequently destroyed in a brushfire.” When physicist and former colleague Leo Szilard heard about the fire, he said it proved not only “that God exists, but that He has a sense of humor.”

LEST WE FORGET
The Cold War Times is a bi-monthly online publication produced for the Cold War Museum and the Cold War Veterans Association. The Cold War Times chronicles the history of the Cold War and notifies subscribers of old war anniversaries, events and activities that relate to the Cold War. Sponsorship and advertisement opportunities are available. Contact gpowersjr@coldwar.org to learn more about sponsorship and advertising opportunities.

The Cold War Veterans Association (CWVA) dedicated to exclusively representing the interests of Cold War Veterans

The Mission of the Cold War Veterans Association is to:
(1) Fight for rights and benefits that Cold War Veterans deserve;
(2) Educate people as to why the Cold War was fought and why vigilance must be maintained; and
(3) Provide a fraternal community for men and women whose patriotism binds them together.

To be eligible for membership, one must have served honorably in the U.S. Armed Forces at some time during the
Cold War period (September 2, 1945 – December 26, 1991).

[*The Cold War Veterans Association is a federally-designated, tax-exempt, 501(c)(19) Veterans Service Organisation.]

**D(DEPARTURE) NOTICES**

Sir **Colin Figures** (1925-2006). From 1981 he was chief of Britain’s MI6 which he had joined after WW2. He spoke Russian and French, and was an important agent in British intelligence from Suez through the Cold War to the Falklands. While acting like the hero in a spy novel, expelling foreign spies and paying off British agents to prevent national embarrassment, he was hardly known to the public.

**Wendy Lowenstein** (1927-2006) Left activist: New Theatre, Communist Party, Victorian Folklore Society, oral historian. (She was a friend of Shirley Andrews who is the subject of a thesis by Jenny Hibben, University of Melbourne. Jenny would be grateful for any information).

**Ken Buckley** (1922-2006) Activist, academic, and historian who did sterling work in the NSW Council for Civil Liberties.

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