Research Reports

Frank Cain has continued his research for his book manuscript on the impact of the US-led embargo against Western trade to the Sino-Soviet bloc. Frank's emphasis is on the responses of the Europeans to this US policy. The time period covered is from 1947 until the early 1970s. Frank Cass will publish the manuscript in 2005.

On a pre-Cold War topic, Frank's book on 'Jack Lang and the Great Depression in Australia in the 1930s' will be published soon by Australian Scholarly Press, Melbourne. There will be a book launch in Sydney and readers are invited to attend. Details to be announced.

Publications


Phillip Mendes, "Remembering the Rosenbergs: Jews, Communism and Spy Scandals in Cold War America", Arena, No 21, 2003/4.


Entries on:
Chambers, Whittaker
Cominform
Fuchs, Klaus
Gouzenko, Igor
Hiss, Alger
Malayan Emergency
Menzies, Robert
Peace Movements
Petrov, Vladimir
Rosenberg, Ethel & Julius
Twentieth Party Congress (USSR).

For the Library

G. Edward White, Alger Hiss's Looking-Glass Wars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy, OUP, 2004
Assumes his guilt and attempts to explain his life long denial.

Conference Reports

Phillip Deery spoke on a panel with Michael Cox (LSE) and Peter McGowan (co-editor Socialist Register) on ‘Rethinking the 1970s: the Different Fate of the two Superpowers’, University of Bologna/ Gramsci Foundation conference entitled Rethinking the 1970s, Bologna, June. 2004.

Wayne Reynolds gave papers at the International Peace Research Association Conference (Security and Disarmament Commission - which he coordinates) on the origins of US pre-emption. The conference was held this year in Sopron, Hungary.

Frank Cain, in London earlier this year, gave a paper at the Menzies Centre on the ‘British and Australian Involvement in the Development and Decline of Missile Technology During the Cold War’.

While in Washington, Frank presented a paper to the Cold War Studies section of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He discussed 'Computers and the Cold War; the US and British Rivalry on Supplying Electronic Computers to the Sino-Soviet Bloc'.

Two Cold War Panels at the Australian Historical Association Biennial conference, 5-9 July 2004, Newcastle

Panel 1 (Chair: Peter Love)
David McKnight:
Rethinking the Cold War

Phillip Deery:
Serving the State? Australian Scientists and the Cold War

Rachael Calkin:
Rethinking Australia’s Response to Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’

Panel 2 (Chair: Phillip Deery)
Frank Cain:
Bob Menzies’ Cold Wars

Kerry Taylor:
Where’s Wally? Reflections on New Zealand’s Cold War

Drew Cottle:
Red-Hunting in Sydney’s Chinatown, 1949-1964


Forthcoming On Radio

A four-part series on the Cold War on Radio National (Hindsight series) early next year (probably February). Produced by Tom Morton. Interviewees include David Lowe and Phillip Deery.

Archives News

Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (vols1-17) are now on line at www.dfat.gov.au/publications/historical documents.

New Cold War Studies Centre at LSE
See www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC
Australian Archives, Melbourne: Change of Address

The reading room has shifted from Casselden Place to the Victorian Archives Centre, 99 Shiel St, North Melbourne.

Researchers can also view records of the Public Record Office Victoria. Veterans will know that the Melbourne collection includes records of many federal departments, including, Postmaster-General's, Labour and National Service, Civil Aviation, and Dept of Defence.

Would users please advise readers of CWD of their experience with the new venue (eg. access to records, facilities, parking etc).

Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Canberra: Change of Address

The Reading Room for the Noel Butlin Archives Centre and University Archives has moved to much improved premises on the ground floor of the Menzies Library building at ANU. The staff have also moved and are enjoying their new offices which offer glimpses of the outside world.

The repository remains in the Acton Underhill and has been refurbished with expanded storage capacity. Records are retrieved twice daily from the Underhill. Intending researchers are as always advised to contact the Archives staff before visiting.

Phone and email contacts are as before - 02 6125 2219 and butlin.archives@anu.edu.au.

National Security Archive

The National Security Archive is an independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public charity, the Archive receives no U.S. government funding; its budget is supported by publication royalties and donations from foundations and individuals. (www.nsarchive.org)

National Security Archive Reveals Roles of Nixon and Kissinger in Chile

(For further information Contact Peter Kornbluh 202 994 7116 pkorn@gwu.edu)

President Richard Nixon acknowledged that he had given instructions to "do anything short of a Dominican-type action" to keep the democratically elected president of Chile from assuming office, according to a White House audio tape posted by the National Security Archive.

A phone conversation captured by his secret Oval Office taping system reveals Nixon telling his press secretary, Ron Zeigler, that he had given such instructions to then U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry, "but he just failed, the son of a bitch... He should have kept Allende from getting in."

A transcript of the president's comments on March 23, 1972, made after the leak of corporate papers revealing collaboration between ITT and the CIA to rollback the election of socialist leader Salvador Allende, was recently published in the National Security Archive book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability by Peter Kornbluh; the tape marks the first time Nixon can be heard discussing his orders to undermine Chilean democracy.
The conversation took place as Zeigler briefed the President on a State Department press conference to contain the growing ITT/CIA scandal which included one ITT document stating that Korry had been "given the green light to move in the name of President Nixon to do all possible short of a Dominican Republic-type action to keep Allende from taking power."

Other declassified records show that Nixon secretly ordered maximum CIA covert operations to "prevent Allende from coming to power or unseat him" in the fall of 1970 but that Ambassador Korry was deliberately not informed of covert efforts to instigate a military coup.

When the White House-ordered covert operations failed to prevent Allende's November 3, 1970 inauguration, Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, lobbied vigorously for a hard-line U.S. policy "to prevent [Allende] from consolidating himself now when we know he is weaker than he will ever be and when he obviously fears our pressure and hostility," according to a previously unknown eight-page briefing paper prepared for the President on November 5, 1970.

In the secret/sensitive "memorandum for the president" Kissinger claimed that Allende's election posed "one of the most serious challenges ever faced in the hemisphere" and that Nixon's "decision as to what to do about it may be the most historic and difficult foreign affairs decision you will have to make this year."

The memorandum reveals that Kissinger forcefully pressed the President to overrule the State Department's position that there was little Washington could do to oppose the legitimately elected president of Chile and that the risks for U.S. interests of intervening to oppose him were greater than coexisting with him. "If all concerned do not understand that you want Allende opposed as strongly as we can, the result will be a steady drift toward the modus vivendi approach," Kissinger informed Nixon.

Kissinger personally requested an hour to brief Nixon on November 5 in preparation for a National Security Council meeting to discuss Chile strategy the next day. The briefing paper records his threat perception of an Allende government as a model for other countries. As Kissinger informed the president: "The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact on - an even precedent value for - other parts of the world, especially in Italy; the imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own position in it." According to a transcript of the NSC meeting published in The Pinochet File, Nixon told his aides the next day that "our main concern is the prospect that [Allende] can consolidate himself and the picture projected to the world will be his success."

"This document is the Rosetta stone for deciphering the motivations of Kissinger and Nixon in undermining Chilean democracy," according to Peter Kornbluh who directs the Archive's Chile Documentation Project. "It reinforces the judgement of history on Kissinger's role as the primary advocate of overthrowing the Allende government."

The Archive has also posted a series of declassified transcripts of Kissinger's staff meetings after he became Secretary of State. The transcripts, dated from the days following the coup that brought
General Augusto Pinochet to power through the first several years of his regime's repression in Chile, record Kissinger's attitude toward human rights atrocities and mounting Congressional pressure to curtail U.S. economic and military assistance to the military regime. They are quoted at length in Kornbluh's book, The Pinochet File, and recently cited in the New York Times Week in Review section (December 28, 2003).

Secret Papers About China Are Released by the C.I.A.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18 - The Central Intelligence Agency made public on Monday a rich trove of previously classified documents on China, including the supposedly authoritative National Intelligence Estimates issued over the 30-year period of Mao Zedong's rule.

For scholars of what Mao called China's "continuous revolution," of its tumultuous and intertwined relationships with the United States, the Soviet Union and Taiwan, and of the American intelligence efforts aimed at understanding the unfolding events, the documents disclose a mixed record of insights and miscues.

A National Intelligence Estimate published in June 1954 said that "no clearly established factions" existed within the Chinese leadership. In fact, the first major party purge had taken place earlier that year, but did not become public for another year.

Yet in the confusion and chaos of the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's, when radicals published so many documented exposés and denunciations that the flow of data became a glut, a 1967 intelligence estimate correctly predicted the probability that cautious military and political leaders would find common cause eventually.

"As long as Mao is capable of political command, China's situation will probably be tense and inherently unstable," it said; a "disorderly and contentious" struggle would follow, and eventually a move away from "discredited" policies to "secure modest economic growth."

In an introduction to the collection of 71 documents, which are on the agency's Web site at www.cia.gov and will be released by the Government Printing Office on compact disc, Robert L. Suettinger, a career intelligence analyst and China scholar, says that "unfortunately, the collection provides only a few examples of this kind of cogent analysis on China's leadership situation." But Mr. Suettinger described the record as "nonetheless an impressive one" in which "the fundamentals are consistently right."

Among the most important judgments, Mr. Suettinger wrote, was a consistently accurate assessment that the Communist Party in China was never challenged from 1948 on in its predominance of power on the Chinese mainland.

Other assessments contained in the documents include one written in 1950, on the eve of China's entry into the Korean War. It correctly said that Chinese forces were capable of either halting the northward path of United Nations forces or of "forcing U.N. withdrawal further south through a powerful assault."

A pair of Special National Intelligence Estimates on China's response and involvement in the Vietnam War made clear that China would not risk an open confrontation with the United States.
One of the estimates, issued in 1966, said, "At present levels of American action [in North Vietnam], we continue to believe that China will not commit its ground or air forces to sustained combat against the U.S."

The documents show that American intelligence agencies were slow to recognize the emergence of differences between the Soviet Union and China in what is known as the Sino-Soviet split. As late as 1966, three years before clashes along the border took the relationship to its lowest state, an estimate described an open break in relations between the Soviet Union and China as unlikely.

A main shortcoming, Mr. Suettinger wrote in his assessment, was "overestimating the importance of ideological solidarity and other centripetal forces within the Communist Bloc at least during the 1950's."

Documents on the emergence and status on China's strategic nuclear forces, the subject of 13 estimates between 1962 and 1974, were heavily censored, Mr. Suettinger writes, but if nothing else, they "reveal that estimating a country's nuclear capabilities - much less intentions - on the basis of a few photographs and other scarce clues has been an imprecise science from the start."

It is a lesson that will not be lost on students of intelligence still looking at the agency's work on Iraq, Iran and North Korea.

Robert L. Hutchings, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, described the documents as presenting "a unique historical record of a formative stage in China's development" between 1948 and 1978, including "the drama of the Chinese Civil War, the establishment and consolidation of Communist rule, and the Sino-Soviet split."

(From NYTimes.com, 19 October, 2004.)

Cold War International History Project (CWIHP)
New Publications

To read newly released CWIHP publications, visit their website at http://cwihp.si.edu and follow the link on the front page.

New CWIHP Bulletin Online, Issue 14/15, with 450 pages of translated documents - the largest ever published by the Project, features new evidence on:
- North Korea and the Cold War;
- The War in Afghanistan;
- Cold War Crises (Korea, Cuba);
- Zhivkov and the Cold War as well as a host of other subjects from the Southern Caucasus to the Kennedy assassination.


In this new Working Paper he draws on extensive research in East German archival records on Korea to present an original and important interpretation of the effect of the Chinese Cultural
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Revolution on the development of North Korean foreign relations.

He demonstrates that China's Cultural Revolution was a greater threat to Kim II Sung's rule and to DPRK security than scholars have previously understood. At the same time, Kim viewed China's chaos and preoccupation as an opportunity to enhance his stature as a leader of Asian Communism. Inspired by the Vietnamese Communists' struggle to reunify their country, Kim II Sung prepared his people for forthcoming reunification with the South and developed audacious schemes to achieve it. The seizure of the USS Pueblo in January 1968 served as a distraction from one of his failed unification plans, the attempted assassination of the South Korean president through a commando raid on the Blue House in Seoul. Schaefer argues that it remains doubtful, however, whether the April 1969 shootdown of a US spy plane with thirty-one men on board was part of this effort.


Book Reviews


Collective portraits are always difficult. Collective portraits of admired friends in the Cold War become exceedingly hazardous. John McLaren presents the lives of three Melbourne communists-Ken Gott, Ian Turner and Stephen Murray-Smith- who leave the Party because of events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and their repercussions in Australia. The literary, historical and cultural works of Turner and Murray-Smith are analysed as are the complications of their private lives when they become radicals free of the Communist Party's strictures and demands.

Each of these men from entirely different class backgrounds found their commitment to the Left shaped by the Great Depression, their wartime experiences and Melbourne University. It was at the Shop that their hearts and heads were given to a bowyang Communism. Their energies and enthusiasm led them from the Labour Club to Party Headquarters, even if Murray-Smith was a member of the Liberal Party for a fortnight. Each was an outstanding intellectual and each accepted the iron discipline of a party suspicious if not contemptuous of longhairs. Turner is sent to work as a cleaner on the Victorian railways while Gott and Murray-Smith escape to Prague or Oxford.

The Australian Communist Party leadership's devotion to Moscow pronouncements disguised under the rubric of democratic centralism rids itself of these Melbourne naysayers and their like after the Khrushchev revelations in 1956. Party members were expected to lay low, follow directives and question nothing in the years after the anti-red referendum and Petrov witch hunt. Leaving the party became a long goodbye for each of them. Turner, complex and complicated, never seemed to have put this leaving behind him.

When they become free radicals their politics become circumscribed. Turner eventually drifts to the Victorian ALP, both Left and Right and finds joy in
Australian folklore and popular culture, particularly, Aussie Rules. His doctoral writing on the Wobs, if it was his way of dealing with the Communist Party as McLaren stresses, was left far behind him. Murray-Smith pours his soul into Overland after rescuing it from the Party. Like Turner, after some petty academic bullying and ASIO vetting he finds an academic bolthole, giving up his intellect to a history of technical education, Australiana and Erith Island. The least satisfying portrait is of Gott after 1956. His rise and rise in the world of Melbourne journalism and finally New York and Business International. These radicals were free, but where were they going?

The Cold War in this book looms large. It often determines the choices the Melbourne men made. Turner and Murray-Smith would return to the academy after their expulsion by the Party and ASIO interference. Gott's life in journalism soon had him making convenient compromises. As interesting as their lives were, there is a lack. They never fulfilled their promise. The promise of their commitment to a cause was lost in the Manichean politics of the Cold War. McLaren dwells too long on their considerable intellectual achievements but even they were not of what they dreamed in a conservative affluent Australia buoyed by the post-war boom. Turner and Murray-Smith escaped into the past, and Gott wrote acceptable journalism, notwithstanding his exposure of the antisemitic League of Rights in Voices of Hate.

McLaren's study of his trio of now dead comrades is poignant and evocative. If he overwrites he does so with deep affection. The fate of these remarkable Left intellectuals in the Cold War is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the cultural, political and personal histories of that unquiet period.

A Stale Affair

The Petrov Affair, by Robert Manne, Text, $23. Review by Humphrey McQueen.

Robert Manne in his 1987 The Petrov Affair, Politics and Espionage provided the first scholarly account of the defection of Soviet diplomat Vladimir Petrov on 3 April 1954. Manne merited his accolades for demolishing an article of Labor faith that ASIO had conspired to help Menzies win another election.

Although a Cold Warrior, Manne was more sceptical than the Petrov Royal Commissioners, was frank about Petrov's venality and fair towards Evatt.

That Manne could teach while mastering so much archival material within three years appeared miraculous. His account was more coherent and polished than any of the subsequent academic volumes on "the nest of traitors". The original is also superior to the version he has repackaged for the fiftieth anniversary. The reference notes are gone and the index halved, with half its page numbers wrong.

In 1987, Manne described his 1985 conversations with the retired head of ASIO, Sir Charles Spry, as "among the most enjoyable of my life". At the time, Manne could not be certain that Spry had sheltered Nazi-era war criminals. The airbrushing of his indebtedness from the reprint is an instance of what Manne's 1996 book on the Helen Darville (aka Demidenko) affair deplored as The culture of forgetting.

Manne has also excised more than half of his material on the reason for ASIO's
existence, namely, to repair relations with the U.S. Exchange of data had been embargoed in 1948 after the discovery that strategic documents were being leaked to the Soviet Embassy in Canberra.

Since 1995, fragments from the decrypted Soviet traffic, known as Venona, have been released. Manne has not used that resource to rethink his analysis of “the Affair” through the prism of ASIO’s need to investigate the Canberra spy-ring while maintaining secrecy over the proof of its existence. Instead, he remains fixated on the original conspiracy hypothesis, boasting that “The historical interpretation is, however, unchanged”. That rigidity is sound for the main issue of whether Menzies and ASIO had concocted the Affair for mere electoral advantage. It will not do for specific points of that story.

For instance, by relying on newspapers, Manne could acquit Menzies of exploiting the defection for electoral advantage in the 1954 campaign. At the time, the Liberal Party Federal Directorate was advising State Divisions to use “word of mouth” against Evatt. A full account of the electorate’s mood would also draw in the international situation, notably the fall of Dien Bien Phu on May 7.

A thorough revision of The Petrov Affair would appreciate how the socializing between Soviet agents and public figures swilled around Canberra as a village of drunks with few diversions and scant accommodation.

Paradoxically, the big loser was Catholic Action. The 1955-57 Labor Splits reduced its leader, B. A. Santamaria, to a spoiler, far from his ambition of settling us on six acres with a goat. The Communist Party came out in front, able to hang on through deals with pro-Evatt unionists. The saddest individual has to be Mrs Petrov, condemned to a life sentence with her sex-crazed dipsomaniac of a husband. On 21 July 2002, ASIO invited Manne to her funeral.

Humphrey McQueen Spices up Stale Affair

The “conspiracies” around Petrov are no longer a state secret. The purpose of the Affair was to track down spies in the Australian government. Evidence of their activities between 1944 and 1948 had come from the decrypting of Soviet signals, a project known by its US tag, VENONA. The cover-up began at once. The Western agencies did not want the Soviets to know that their codes were being cracked. The FBI did not tell the CIA about VENONA until 1952; the CIA’s in-house historian suspects that President Truman was never informed.

The significance of VENONA in Australia can be approached by considering who in Australia was told about it? (that is “indoctrinated”) How much were they told? And when?

During MI5 inquiries in Canberra in 1948, the Secretary of the Department of External, John Burton, refused to take an oath that he would not inform his minister (Evatt) of any information from Defence Intelligence. Outraged, Burton complained to Prime Minister Chifley without results. The head of Defence Intelligence at the time was Colonel Spry who, in 1984, hinted: “It is possible that the Prime Minister had already taken the oath himself”.

As opposition leader, Menzies had not been ‘indoctrinated’ before his overseas tour throughout the second half of 1948. Perhaps he glimpsed the truth in
Cold War Dossier (15)

Washington where he got the five-star treatment at an October 14 luncheon in the Pentagon with Defence Secretary James V. Forrestal, the Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries for each of the services, General Omar Bradley and John McCloy, known as “The Chairman of the Establishment”. In March 1949, when the Secretary of Australia’s Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden, was heading to Washington to try to ease the embargo, opposition leader Menzies wrote a letter of introduction to Forrestal, a sign that he was in the loop, to some extent.

If so, that revelation would help to explain why Menzies changed his mind about banning the Communist Party, a course he had resisted despite pressure on his leadership. On his return in January 1949, he declared that “we can no longer deal with Communism as an eccentricity … it is a form of high treason”. That final phrase suggests that he had been told of the spy ring, if not about the decrypts.

One strand in the argument for a conspiracy against Evatt has been that Menzies handpicked the Commissioners. He did, but not for their politics. The selection criteria included whether their Honours were suitable cases for “indoctrination”. The evaluation was easier for the senior counsel assisting the Commission, Major-General Victor Windeyer. His recent membership of the Military Board outweighed any concern that his practice in equity and commercial law had not honed the forensic skills required to break down hostile witnesses.

Having got hold of Petrov and whatever files he could bring with him from the Embassy, ASIO initiated multiple minor conspiracies – better called organisation and methods. Above all, it had to pretend in public that the Petrov documents were the origin of “the Case” on which it had been slaving for five years. ASIO had to build on what the Petrovs had supplied, not much of which was relevant.

The need for secrecy about the decrypts could explain why the list of informants with codenames found in Petrov’s Document G replicated that brought out by MI5 in 1948. The Petrov list had been in an envelope marked “N” that his predecessor had left for him but which he claimed never to have opened during his three years as resident spymaster. If ASIO was tempted to forge evidence, then this section of Document G would have been a prime instance. The reason behind such a plant would have been to get the names into the open without giving away the existence of the VENONA decrypts. So secret did VENONA remain that during in-camera sessions, some evidence was not even recorded.

ASIO’s acolytes and critics both accept that the fount of the leaks was External Affairs, leaving the Department of Defence in the clear. Yet, the British ‘Top Secret’ items that passed to the Soviet embassy in Canberra were Defence documents. The 1945-46 Royal Commission in Canada, moreover, had found penetration at senior levels in its armed services.

In 1948, the MI5 investigators accepted that the Defence officials with access to the British plan were of “unquestioned reliability”. It remains to be tested in public whether their reliability was also unquestionable. Spry would have been the last person to ask. He had become Director of Military Intelligence in 1946 after joining the Army when he was 17. His fellow officers were British gentlemen, indeed, chaps.
A bigger puzzle is why academic spy-catchers have not paid more attention to the doings of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) in Australia during the 1940s. Its representative here from 1942 to 1947 was Viktor Zaitsev. As Second Secretary at the Soviet embassy in Tokyo until October 1941, Zaitsev had been party to the most successful espionage operation of all time, centered on Richard Sorge. Among several achievements, his ring had informed Moscow of Japan’s decision to swing south, and not to join its Axis partner in a pincer movement against the USSR.

Parallels between Zaitsev’s past and the seepage of Allied battle documents to Tokyo in 1944-45 merit better attention than the welter of speculations floated by Des Ball and David Horner in Breaking the Codes. Their tome traces Zaitsev’s socialising around Canberra, but ignores his access to the US Embassy on consular business.

The likelihood that Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) had run its own agents obliged ASIO to persist with “the Case” decades after the Klod group had ceased to be active. Moscow had instructed its Canberra staff to establish a network that could function here behind the lines in the event of war or the severing of diplomatic relations. External Affairs officer Ric Throssell concluded that ASIO had decided that its inability to prove any wrong-doing by him in the 1940s did not establish his reliability but rather pointed to his being a sleeper.

ASIO could never abandon the hunt for moles in Attorney-General’s, CSIRO, External Affairs, or one of the five defence departments. Nor was ASIO itself above suspicion. Peter Wright’s allegations against Roger Hollis as the Soviet’s man in MI5 inflamed fears in Canberra because Hollis had set up ASIO. Had he left sleepers behind? In 1978, Richard Hall alleged in The Secret State that Soviet penetration of ASIO had led to the 1975 departure of its Director-General, Peter Barbour.

Fifty years on from the defection, it seems improbable that the conjunction of “Petrov” with “conspiracy” will cease. Let’s hope that, by 2054, no one will be talking about a plot by Menzies merely to defeat Evatt at the polls. Attention is already moving towards the multiple conspiracies that flowed from the need by Western intelligence to conceal VENONA while using those decrypts for covert and public investigations into Soviet espionage around the world.

**Canberra Labour History Scholarship**

The Canberra Region Branch of the Australian Society for the Study of Labour History (ASSLH) and the National Institute for Social Sciences and Law at the Australian National University (NISSL) invite students doing honours or equivalent to apply for a scholarship to do research at the Noel Butlin Archives Centre (NBAC), based at ANU in Canberra.

The aim of the scholarship is to assist a promising student, with an interest in labour history and/or the labour movement more generally, to overcome the financial obstacles to doing research in Canberra.

One scholarship will be granted each year, for up to $1000, to assist with fares to Canberra, accommodation, and other research expenses. Academic and research assistance and supervision in Canberra will also be offered.
The NBAC is the largest non-government archive in Australia, and trade union and business records, along with the personal papers of left wing and labour movement activists.


Applications should be in the form of a letter addressing the criteria, along with photocopies of all relevant documentary evidence and a statement agreeing to the scholarship conditions. Applications for the 2005 scholarship will close on 26 November 2004 and the scholarship awarded by 17 December.

Applications should be addressed to Labour History Scholarship Noel Butlin Archives Centre Australian National University, ACT 0200

Inquiries can be directed to: Dr Paul Pickering, NISSL, tel 02 6125 3451, paul.pickering@anu.edu.au or Dr Sigrid McCausland, NBAC, tel 02 6125 9602, sigrid.mccausland@anu.edu.au or Phil Griffiths, ASSLH, tel 0415 752 012, phil.griffiths@optusnet.com.au

D(Departure) Notices

No More Surfing the Net with Christopher Francis Taylor (1949-2004)

Readers of the Cold War Dossier and the historical community generally will be saddened by the death of Chris in February this year. Born in England in 1949, Chris came to Australia as a child. A brilliant student, he was a first class honours graduate in history from Sydney University. He received a scholarship to study Burmese history in London from 1972-75. Supplementing his British research with a stint at the Sorbonne, where he acquired good French, Chris mastered the intricacies of the Burmese language. On returning to Australia he turned down offers from academia, preferring the security of public service work. He joined the Australian Archives in 1977 and the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1984 where he worked as an archivist and information officer. Over many years, Chris helped countless historians in gaining access to archival information on the history of Australian foreign and trade policy. The professionalism of his work is acknowledged around the world in published historical works. He was also a bon vivant and raconteur. Chris was a regular contributor to CWD and is sadly missed by all who knew him. (David Lee).

James MacGibbon

Death-bed confession of the spy who got away. James MacGibbon, who died four years ago, aged 88, admitted in a 12-page affidavit, kept secret until now, that he had spied for the Russians while in the War Office

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1336467,00.html

Paul Henry Nitz (1907-2004)

(pronounced nits-uh)

After early success as a Wall Street financier, his political career began in 1940 and stretched from the WWII Strategic Bombing Survey to negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces under Reagan. (See his memoir, From Hiroshima to Glasnost; and archive documents posted by National Security Archive on 27 Oct 2004.)
Missile Treaty Negotiator and Cold War Strategist
(From NYTimes.com, 21 October 2004.)

Paul H. Nitze was an expert on military power and strategic arms whose roles as negotiator, diplomat and Washington insider helped shape America's cold war relationship with the Soviet Union.

From the beginning of the nuclear age, whether in government or out, Mr. Nitze urged successive American presidents to take measures against what he saw as the Soviet drive to overwhelm the United States through the force of arms. Yet he may be best remembered for his conciliatory role in efforts to achieve two major arms agreements with the Soviet Union.

In one, he was successful in negotiating an agreement that eliminated intermediate-range missiles from Europe. In the other, he hoped to cap his long career with a so-called grand compromise in 1988 that would have severely circumscribed work on President Reagan's cherished strategic missile defense initiative in exchange for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers. His efforts foundered when the negotiators ran out of time as the Reagan administration came to an end.

In a now legendary moment of the cold war, Mr. Nitze undertook a bold but unsuccessful personal effort to achieve an earlier arms agreement with the Russians. In 1982, acting on his own and, some say, superseding his instructions, Mr. Nitze took a walk with his Soviet counterpart in the Jura Mountains, where he tried to strike a bargain on a package dealing with intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

In that episode - which later became the subject of the Broadway play "A Walk in the Woods" by Lee Blessing - Mr. Nitze tried to cut through the bureaucratic tangle but was thwarted when both Moscow and Washington repudiated the agreement.

In 1940 a summons from James V. Forrestal, then a special assistant at the White House, lured Mr. Nitze from the lucrative confines of Wall Street to the first of many assignments in government that involved him in the supply of the Allies for the war effort, a survey of the impact of the Allied bombing of Germany and Japan, the feeding of the hungry of war-ravaged Europe, the creation of the Marshall Plan and crises in Iran and Berlin.

In the aftermath of World War II, Mr. Nitze became part of the remarkable group of public servants - George F. Kennan, Charles E. Bohlen, Robert A. Lovett, John J. McCloy - that coalesced around Dean Acheson to develop foreign political and military policy as the United States took its place as a major world power.
He was a senior State Department official in the Truman administration, an assistant defense secretary in the Kennedy administration, and Navy secretary and later deputy defense secretary in the Johnson administration.

By the time he became one of the chief negotiators on strategic weapons, Mr. Nitze had accumulated more experience in national security affairs than anyone else of his time, to the point that his critics began to think that he believed he had a monopoly on understanding the political uses of nuclear weapons.

**Post war Policy Framework**

Ever since 1950, when as head of the policy planning staff of the State Department he was the principal author of a study on the Soviet threat, Mr. Nitze took a dark view of Soviet intentions, seeing in the Kremlin a drive for world hegemony.

The study, known as N.S.C.-68, conceived of deterrence in military rather than diplomatic terms, warned against sole reliance on the nuclear deterrent and urged a buildup of conventional forces.

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