Publications


The Sydney Branch of the ASSLH has published *Communism in Australia: A Supplementary Resource Bibliography, c. 1994 – 2001*. Compiled by **Beverly Symons**, with an introduction by **Stuart Macintyre**, the 90 page bibliography is a companion volume to the 1994 resource tool published by the National Library of Australia. It lists and details some 800 new items, including manuscript and oral history collections, books, chapters, articles, reviews, and theses. Price is $14.95 plus $2 postage. Order from *Bibliography, Sydney Branch, Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, PO Box 1027, Newtown, NSW, 2042*.

For the Library

Truth stranger than the fiction of John Le Carré:


**Lefty Freeman**, *One Man’s Fight Against ASIO*, RMIT University, 2002.

The story of a migrant from Greece in 1949 who came under surveillance and had his status as a resident revoked. This was a common experience and in contrast to the experience of anti-communists.

**Fred Jerome**, *The Einstein File: J. Edgar Hoover’s Secret War Against the World’s Most Famous Scientist*, St Martin’s Press.

Based on FBI files of 1800 pages covering 20 years and which is largely tittle-tattle. According to Jerome, Hoover pursued a
personal vendetta. Einstein was anti-fascist, Jewish, and an intellectual, and with Paul Robeson was co-chairman of the American Crusade to End Lynching - that must have burst Hoover’s bra and lacy suspenders.

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**Humphrey McQueen’s review of Jerome’s book was broadcast on ABC Radio National’s Book Talk, on Saturday, 28 September 2002:**

On August 2nd, 1939, Albert Einstein warned US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that Hitler’s scientists were developing a weapon of mass destruction - the atomic bomb. The mathematician advised the statesman to do likewise. Nothing much happened for several months.

The tardiness of a government is less out of character than Einstein’s military-mindedness. As a teenager, he’d fled Germany for Switzerland to avoid conscription. After the Great War, he sponsored the War Resisters’ League, and kept up links with pacifist groups for the rest of his life. Yet, throughout the 1930s, Einstein supported those who used physical force against fascism. For instance, he would champion the US citizens who volunteered for the Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War.

Einstein was visiting Princeton when the Nazis came to power in January 1933. He stayed on, becoming a US citizen in October 1940. Two months earlier, the Army had denied Einstein a security clearance to work on the bomb that his letter to Roosevelt had initiated. Einstein declined a later invitation to act as an advisor.

Fred Jerome suggests that the Army blackballed Einstein because it feared that he alone had the prestige to lead other scientists astray – that is, to oppose the dropping of the bomb. There’s no doubt that he had that prestige and that he opposed its use, appealing, in April 1945, to Roosevelt not to use it against people. He pointed out that he had called for the bomb only because the Nazis were making one. Once the Germans gave up their research, all justification disappeared. Had Einstein been at Los Alamos, there can be little doubt that he would have been a moral saboteur. He came to believe that Hiroshima had been A-bombed to end the war before the Soviets could occupy parts of Japan. But Fred Jerome’s explanation of the Army ban in 1940 is to read history backwards. It’s more likely that the army excluded Einstein because he was not a US citizen, and because of his FBI file.

The existence of an FBI file on Einstein has been public knowledge since 1983. Pressure under Freedom of Information laws has recently revealed more of its contents. That the FBI kept a file about the world’s most famous scientist is unremarkable. That’s what police forces do. The famous need protection from assassins. Wartime security demanded checking anyone with access to sensitive material. The FBI would have been remiss had it not opened a file on Einstein. What surprised many people was the line of inquiry pursued by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

The file gathered newspaper reports of Einstein’s support for social and political radicals, far beyond his anti-war stance. Here too, surprise would be misplaced. During his lifetime, Einstein was notorious for his left-wing politics. Only in death has he been packaged as the absent-minded professor. When Time magazine pictured him as its man of the century, it forgot to mention his 1949 article “Why socialism” - penned for a New York Marxist monthly.

A weak spot in Jerome’s treatment of the Einstein file is his bemusement at the way that the FBI took seriously the allegations by nutcases. Jerome expects us to join him in thinking that Hoover was as certifiably insane as the anonymous Jew-baiter who reported that Einstein was working on a death-ray. Now, it is
true that if all the pages from the fruit-loops were removed from the Einstein file, there wouldn’t be much left. But Jerome fails to see that the FBI was engaging in the normal police practice of tracing patterns of association. Today, a television cop show would call it “profiling”. Jerome’s failure to grasp this objective is odd given that he knows how much of the inquisition was to get people to name names.

The real surprise in 1983 was the paper trail of Hoover’s determination to prove that Einstein had been part of a Soviet network in Berlin, a member of the German Communist Party, and an associate of atomic spies during the 1940s. Not to be outdone, the Immigration Service sought to strip Einstein of his US citizenship on the grounds that he had concealed his membership of the Communist Party.

The allegations of espionage did not crop up until after late in 1949 when President Truman announced that the Soviets had the bomb. Spy stories then flourished. Senator Joe McCarthy at once pinned his re-election hopes to exposing Reds in the government. That atmosphere did not spontaneously combust into reports about Einstein being a player in the Red orchestra. The most likely explanation is that the charges were recycled by the Nazi intelligence officials whom Washington had recruited for the Cold War. Jerome’s conclusion is clear cut: the FBI’s “underlying premise”, he writes, “is a lie”. Einstein did not threaten to subvert America.

Despite this categorical declaration, Jerome has assembled more than enough evidence to demonstrate that Einstein was un-American. Hoover’s FBI, the Immigration Service and the congressional investigators shared a definition of what it meant to be “American”. For example, one loyalty board asked a civil servant if she had supported the desegregation of blood by the Red Cross, as if that were subversive. If American was segregation, anti-Semitism and big business, then Einstein was 100 per cent un-American.

And so were millions more, both immigrants and the native-born. It was the existence of this mass of dissenters that made the Red Scare necessary. Through the hunt for spies, the population had to be taught not to hate the system. This indoctrination was not easy after capitalism had delivered two world wars, fascism and a depression. The doubters had to be frightened into silence. That was the job of the public interrogators such as Joe McCarthy.

So as not to give self-incriminating evidence, liberals, progressives and Communists retreated behind the fifth amendment. By contrast, Einstein publicly urged civil disobedience. Instead of refusing to answer on constitutional grounds, he poked his tongue out at the inquisitors. Einstein’s gravest offence against Americanism was to treat blacks as if they were human beings. Marion Anderson was not allowed to stay at the leading hotel when she performed in Princeton in 1937. The Einsteins took her in. Einstein became a close friend of the actor-singer Paul Robeson and the activist-scholar W E B du Bois. Part of the legacy of prejudice is that du Bois is not instantly recognisable although he deserved a Nobel Prize for Literature as much as did Churchill. At the age of 83, du Bois was brought into court handcuffed for his refusal to conform. Both Robeson and du Bois could say that no Red had ever called them “nigger”.

Across the 1930s, Einstein had supported the Communist-led campaigns to prevent judicial lynchings. After 1945, Southern whites tried to put the uppity niggers back in their box. Fifty-six lynchings were reported in the first year of peace. Most of the victims were returning soldiers. Again, Einstein spoke out for racial justice.
Einstein was committed to science as the common possession of humankind. Our world is still terrorised by the US refusal to place its nuclear weapons under international control. As early as 1946, Washington initiated research on the H-bomb. Einstein’s last public act was to endorse the Pugwash Conference of scientists working for disarmament.

Some fifty years later, nuclear disarmament is as remote today as it was in 1945 when the US government became the only power to use those weapons of mass destruction against human beings, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The conclusion of the Cold War in the early 1990s has not put an end to the strategy of mutually assured destruction – also known as MAD. Instead, in February last, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved the hands of its doomsday clock two minutes nearer to midnight. That was before the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan. The reason for adjusting the clock closer to disaster was that the US is pulling away from disarmament treaties. A recent agreement between the US and Russian presidents will let the US keep its nuclear arsenal primed. The misreporting of that deal as a step towards peace is another ground for pessimism.

To be optimistic these days is to hope that the death of millions of people on the Indian sub-continent would shock the rest of the world into disarmament. The experience of the past sixty years suggests that the reverse outcome is just as likely. George W. Bush would use any nuclear outbreak as a reason to construct the death-ray dreamed up by a lunatic to slander Einstein.

Anna Binnie (Macquarie) is working on the final draft of her PhD thesis on the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. She has submitted for publication an article arguing that the scientific basis of Wayne Reynolds’ work is flawed.

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John Steinbach outlines his PhD thesis:

I am looking at, and doing a bit of revisiting/re-interpretation along the way, the interplay between threats, fear and politics in Australia between 1946 and 1955, against the background of the major national and international security concerns of the times: the Cold War, anti-communism, ANZUS origins, NSRB, SEATO, the Malaya adventure and nuclear weaponry. The thesis uses the ideas in Barry Buzan's 'People, States and Fear', as well as those of some of the seminal writers of realism (Morgenthau, Carr).

In the first chapter, I examine the differences between the Chifley government and the Service chiefs' views of what security in an Australian context meant, particularly post-World War II. The experiences from the war led to two distinguishing and almost irreconcilable lessons: firstly, that Australia cannot rely on a great power, and secondly, that it is militarily too weak to be able to protect itself against the range of threats real and/or imaginary it envisages to exist and therefore has to ally with someone who can. This irony becomes the basis for much of the tensions in policy-making. Or put another way, exaggerated threats raise fear levels to a point where these can only be assuaged via the assurances of a powerful ally. Overlaid were the problems of communism: how to deal with it at the national and international level.

Chapter 2 examines the increasingly divisive politics of the Liberal Party under Menzies' leadership, making issue of a broad but immaterial political threat, giving it the
semblance of a military threat and acting accordingly, frequently linking domestic politics with events overseas. It also highlights the lack of objectivity in analysing international events, now couched in the terse language of the Cold War. That leads to questions of the purpose of the threats being enunciated: whether in Buzan's words, '...posturing on security concerns may have more to do with electoral needs, ideological pretensions, internal power struggles, and the rituals of party rivalry rather than serious thinking about the issues themselves.'

Chapter 3 looks at the reasons for Australia joining ANZUS with the conclusion that there probably wasn't one with the possible exception that an alliance with the US was better than none. The basic doubts from the WWII experience probably explain why so much effort was made to get involved in global planning via ANZUS: perhaps through involvement in such planning, the Australian government could if not directly influence strategy then at least understand Australia’s place in American plans. And then there would have been undoubted electoral benefits in it. This uncertainty has led to the endless ingratiating reaffirmations of ANZUS by both major Australian parties with the US.

The creation of the NSRB and the rearmament programs initiated by Menzies in the early 1950s are dealt with in Chapter 4. The NSRB presents problems of interpretation. It was a failure for what it was ostensibly set up to achieve but then the government had already lost interest in it by mid-1952 if not earlier. Menzies had justified it in terms of threats but what were his other purposes? There was a lot of union-bashing involved and insinuations about the ALP's anti-communism. Given Menzies' WWII experience and his constitutional law background, he would have realised from the outset that the NSRB lacked the authority for much of what he said it was set up to accomplish, suggesting other motives at play. The legislation that accompanied the NSRB dwells at length on levels of industrial productivity and that provides a clue: it was essentially a domestic issue but built upon imagined threats.

The following chapter deals with the reasons for Australian entry into SEATO. This owed a lot to continuing uncertainties over ANZUS. Fear of Asia, xenophobia and racism all played their parts in the threat scenarios developed by the government justifying entry: the more relevant SEATO was made out to be to Australia, the more threatening China became (in that order). Again, there was a real effort to get involved in 'global planning' but again the Americans denied access, despite Casey's lament that it was embarrassing to Australia to be thus rejected.

The final two chapters consider in more detail how fear was managed following the 1951 referendum. They argue that Menzies' anti-communism was measured: his was not of the over-zealous brand shared by Wentworth or Tommy White and he resisted the former's attempts at introducing discriminatory laws into the House; rather it was used as the occasion demanded. Neither was there in Australia those excesses of anti-communism that pervaded the United States as a 'grande peur'. Anti-communism was a weapon for the invocation of fear which on balance would benefit the conservative side of politics but it had to be frequently aroused because it was not really a spontaneous phenomenon.

Two case studies examine how fear was managed to achieve outcomes for the government. The first considers the decision to send an Australian infantry battalion to Malaya in 1955. The reasons Menzies used to justify that were based on threat hyperbole and fears arising from circumstances that no longer existed. Moreover, he went to considerable pains to misrepresent the substance of discussions he had with the US President on the subject which he would use in Parliament to justify his intentions. His decision to commit
Australian forces to Malaya should be seen in the light of what was happening on the domestic front at the time - the split in the Labor Party.

The second study examines the politics of civil defence against nuclear weapons. In this case, the dangers of nuclear attack were played down for reasons of financial prioritising and the emphasis on 'forward defence'. The logical difficulty was that 'forward defence' and civil defence were supposed to deal with threats arising from the same source. This begs the question why Menzies pursued one and not the other. For all the emphasis on 'forward defence', it was, by the standards of the commitments of Australia's allies, a feeble effort but it was always made out to be something much grander.

At the Australian Archives

The Record Search is a marvelous aid and the first installment of research. But it lists only 20% of total holding with uneven cover. For thorough research, there is no substitute for the time-consuming examination of the Series Index (Black Binders). When you come to order many of these additional items they will not register, and you will have to fill out the application for access form. Do this early in your research for you can expect delays.

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Surfing With Chris Taylor

The Journal of Cold War Studies is a quarterly review published since 1999 by the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies. The Journal is edited by Mark Kramer, Harvard University, and published by The MIT Press.

Its website is at:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/journal.htm

From looking at abstracts of articles in earlier issues, it’s clear that – apart from some on cultural issues – the emphasis is on high-level foreign and defence policy matters. I don’t really think its concerns would be of immediate relevance to readers of the Cold War Dossier.

The latest edition came out in Autumn (Fall) 2002. The key articles in it are:

“The Planning Coordination Group: Bureaucratic Casualty in the Cold War Campaign to Exploit Soviet-Bloc Vulnerabilities” by James Marchio

“The Origins of the Reagan Administration’s Arms Control Policy” by Rose McDermott

“Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?” by Jeremi Suri

“Stalin, the Pact with Nazi Germany, and the Origins of Postwar Soviet Diplomatic Historiography” by Geoffrey Roberts

Names on the editorial board give some idea of its leanings and credibility:

Archie Brown
Oxford University

Lawrence Freedman
King's College, University of London

John Lewis Gaddis
Yale University

James G. Hershberg
George Washington University

David Holloway
As to Cold War History, this is quite respectable and a detailed account of it can be found at the web address http://www.frankcass.com/jnls/cwh.htm. It’s much like the other journal in scope and emphasis and shares some editors with it (see below).

The contents of its latest edition (April 2002) are:

“Kennedy, Bush and Crisis Management” by Lawrence Freedman

“Diplomacy and the Legacy of the Cold War: Post-11 September” by Vojtech Mastny

“Neutral on our Side”: US Policy towards Sweden during the Eisenhower Administration” by Simon Moores

“Britain and ‘LBJ’s War’”, 1964–68 by John W Young

RESEARCH REPORT – Sources for the Study of Italian Foreign Policy, 1861–1999 by Leopoldo Nuti

REVIEW ARTICLE – The Johnson Administration and ‘Confrontation’ by Ang Cheng-Guan

Some names on its international editorial board may enlighten you:

Anne Deighton, Oxford University
Lawrence Freedman, Kings College, London (co-chair)
John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University
Jonathan Haslam, Cambridge University
James G. Hershberg, George Washington University
David Holloway, Stanford University
Lawrence Kaplan, Georgetown University
David Reynolds, Cambridge University
John W. Young, Nottingham University

Other major projects on, or of relevance to, the Cold War are:

- the Cold War International History Project (web address: http://cwihp.si.edu/default.htm), established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

The Cold War International History Project “disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ‘the other side’ - the former Communist world”. It’s fairly mainstream foreign policy-oriented stuff. Their latest doing was to co-sponsor a conference on “NATO, the Warsaw Pact and the Rise of Détente”, 26-28 September 2002, Dobbiaco, Italy, with papers on “US Foreign Policy and the Loss of the Euro-Centric Paradigm” and “A Prelude to Détente: The Strange Case of a Regional Inter-blocs Cooperation and Intra-blocs Confrontation in the Balkans: 1964-1974”, all of which give you some idea of their preoccupations.

and note especially

- The National Security Archive (NSA) at George Washington University (web address: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/).
This produces a much more wide-ranging and critical discussion on US foreign policy – and its actual effects on human beings rather than on “bifurcated teleological semiology” or whatever!

Its self-description is that it “is an independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A tax-exempt public charity, the Archive receives no U.S. government funding; its budget is supported by publication royalties and donations from foundations and individuals.”

The NSA covers much more than documents from the Cold War and amongst other things lifts the lid on US involvement in human rights abuses across the world. (An important release organised by the project was of documents on Kissinger and Ford’s involvement in the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. This came out last December)

As far as the Cold War is concerned, the Archive has published numerous books (e.g. “Bay of Pigs Declassified The Secret CIA Report. A National Security Archive Documents Reader”). Its website is essential reading for sources on the Cold War and contains some eye-and-ear-popping material, including audio tapes of Kennedy’s Cabinet meetings during the Missile Crisis and the ever popular exhibit on the discussions between Elvis and Nixon in the war on the Black Panthers et al! (The Elvis display alone is worth the visit to the website).

More Cold War Sources on the Net

Laurence Maher has been mining U.S. archives.

Newly Declassified Material from the Harry S Truman Papers. The Truman Library has released approximately 1,100 pages of previously declassified material from the Harry S. Truman Papers.

The documents date primarily from the later years of the Truman administration. The majority of the documents were generated by the National Security Council. However, researchers will also find correspondence between the White House and the Secretary of Defense’s office, budget information (FY 1953, 1954), briefing books from conferences (e.g. Truman-Attlee talks, 1950), and Cabinet memoranda.

All of the documents are from Truman Papers: President Secretary’s Files (PSF). The series (subseries) below are the same as those used in the PSF:

- Agencies
- Bureau of the Budget
- Cabinet
- Conferences
- Foreign Affairs
- National Security Council
- National Security Council - Meetings

The papers are available at: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/declass.htm

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Public Record Office: New document releases

Dr David Turner has forwarded details of the September 2002 document releases from the PRO. The papers are available at: http://www.pro.gov.uk/releases/Sep2002/ho325-default.htm

David cites an example of the MI5 / Special Branch turf war, 1944 style:

HO325/17 Security Service: consideration of transfer to police of certain functions
Before October 1931, Special Branch of the police had the responsibility for monitoring subversives and Communists, as well as other threats to national security. This was then transferred to the Security Service (MI5). In HO 325/16 (1944) there is a report from the Home Office suggesting that this function should be transferred back to the police. In HO 325/17 Sir David Petrie, Director General of MI5, and previously chief of the police in India, offers his opinion in no uncertain terms. Petrie casts doubt on the ‘mental equipment’ of the police, and reflects on ‘the ugly question of corruption’, amongst other concerns.

Research Reports

From Phillip Deery:

Hot City, Cold War

Spending six months working on the Cold War with other Cold War historians in a research centre whose specific project was the Cold War - and being paid in American dollars - was close to academic bliss. New York University’s International Center for Advanced Studies (ICAS), which overlooks Washington Square Park in downtown Manhattan, commenced a three-year project on the Cold War. The first year’s theme, in which I was involved, concerned the nature of war and peace since 1945.

Our weekly seminar discussions revolved around a range of topics that sought to rethink the dominant paradigms of the Cold War. These topics included Cold War periodisation (there was vigorous debate over when the Cold War commenced and if it had ended); the role of smaller powers, such as Australia, in shaping the Cold War; empires and decolonisation (from the Congo to Malaya); ethnicity and changing forms of violence since the end of the Cold War; clandestine and non-military forms of intervention such as ‘psyops’ during counter-insurgency operations (which I worked on); social revolution and civil war (one ICAS researcher had conducted fascinating field work in Nicaragua); the politics of population movements during the Greek Civil War; and – given the shadow of 11 September – forms of terrorism. Interestingly, a number of common themes emerged: the evolution and impact of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War; the role of non-State actors in military conflicts; the impact of political diasporas; and the intersecting dynamics of North/South (as well as the more customary East/West) from 1945 to the present.

In addition to seminars the Center also organised symposia and conferences. One conference that was especially memorable focused on ‘Triumphalism in Cold War historiography’. The list of speakers, some ‘house-hold’ names to Cold War historians in Australia, was formidable: Bruce Cumings (University of Chicago) whose multi-volume work on the Korean War set new benchmarks; Ray Garthoff (Brookings Institute), a highly ranked Cold War scholar and former adviser to Kennedy and Johnson (who, authoritatively, informed the stunned audience that a former general secretary of a west European Communist Party simultaneously worked for the CIA); Odd Arne Westad (LSE), author of Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: 2000) and editor of the new journal Cold War History; the legendary Charles Maier (Harvard University); and Ellen Schrecker and Maurice Isserman, both well-known to historians of the CPUSA and the McCarthy period.

The other five ICAS fellows were a mixed bag – mixed in terms of both derivation (St Petersburg, Budapest, Bologna, Athens and Colombo) and current research interests (Kaliningrad/Königsberg, Cold War Détente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, CIA intervention in Italy, the Greek Civil War, development and underdevelopment). We talked, debated, ate together, drank together
and became firm friends. All of us were distinctly left-leaning which dovetailed with and, often, was surpassed by the sophisticated radicalism of the ICAS staff and associates. (The Director of the Cold War Project, the incomparable Marilyn Young, can get her books on the Vietnam War published in the UK and Europe but their strident anti-Americanism challenge the narrowing boundaries of tolerance and have difficulty finding mainstream US publishers.) We also worked with Visiting Fellows such as the prolific John Prados (historian with the National Security Archive, Washington) whose latest book, *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby* (OUP, 2002) uses hitherto unexamined archives.

The second year of the project has just commenced and its theme is ‘Everyday Life, Knowledge and Culture in the Cold War’. The new group of fellows and associates (drawn from Canada, Japan, Sweden, South Africa, UK and the US) are expected to consider the processes of and resistance to Americanisation and Sovietisation in various domains of daily life. If any readers of this *Cold War Dossier* decided that their current research fitted the theme for the third year – ‘History, Governance, Alternatives’ – then I would strongly urge the submission of an application.

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Frank Cain reports:

I attended a conference of the International Intelligence History Association held in Berlin from 31 May to 2 June 2002. The Conference title was “Translantic Intelligence Cooperation Past and Future” and my paper was a ”Review of the Intelligence Agencies in Australia During the Cold War”. The conference was interesting in that it was attended by former officers of Cold War intelligence organisations such as the CIA, German Intelligence (BND), Dutch Intelligence and Norwegian Intelligence. ASIO and ASIS did not seem to be represented. This Intelligence History Association has commenced publication of an English language Journal titled the ‘The Journal of Intelligence History’ published by Lit at Munster in Germany. Readers of *Cold War Dossier* might consider sending an article for publication.

I also visited Prague in February 2002 to collect further material on Dr Ian Milner and the structure of the Czech Security Service known as the StB during the Cold War and with whom Dr Milner was assumed to be connected.

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D (Departure) Notices

**Evdokia Alexeyevna Petrov** (d. July 2002, aged 88) wife of Vladimir Petrov (d. 1991 aged 84). The occasion brought out of the newspaper files that photograph of Sydney Airport – the most effective piece of Cold War propaganda. Amid the trite and garbled rehashes was the revelation that the young man on the left was John Shaw (then a Melbourne Herald reporter, aged 22). Shaw recalls he was trying to speak to Mrs Petrov and, “she was saying ‘Go away, leave me alone’”. (Canberra Times 27/7/02)

Bob Callender of the Sydney *Sun*, picked up the shoe she lost in the melee. As a victim of the Cold War, one can only speculate on her lonely life as Maria Anna Allyson at Bentleigh, Melbourne.

**Brigadier Francis (Ted) Serong**, d. 1/10/02. Anti-communist Cold War warrior, and “counter-insurgency expert” was employed by the CIA in Vietnam, having been seconded from the Australian Army. In her biography, *There to the Bitter end: Ted Serong in Vietnam*, Anne Blair presents a more favourable picture
than CIA’s Frank Snepp who painted him as a bit of a charlatan in Decent Interval.

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